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This paper discusses the NASA Headquarters mishap response process for the Space 
Shuttle and International Space Station programs, and how the process has evolved based 
on lessons learned from the Space Shuttle ClzaNcnger and Columbiu accidents. It also 
describes the NASA Headquarters Space Operations Center (SOC) and its special role in 
facilitating senior management's overall situational awareness of critical spaceflight 
operations, before, during, and after a mishap, to ensure a timel) and effectire contingency 
response. 
1. Introduction 
Spaceflight is a risky business. Although every reasonable effort is made to ensure the safety of space vehicles 
and their crews, there is always some residual risk of a mishap, so contingency plans and c~pabilities are established 
to assist in the recovery from a space operations mishap. Senior managers at the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) Headquarters will be heavily involved in the response to serioiis inishaps involving the 
Space Shuttle Program (SSP) or the International Space Station (ISS), as they were for Space Shuttles C h a l l e ~ ~ g e ~  in 
I 986 and C<~lumbia in 2003. 
Following the Space Shuttle Cl7allenger and Columbia accidents, the Roger's Cominission and the Columbia 
Accident l~~vestigation Board, respectively, werc chartered to determine the lechnical and organizational 
deficiencies responsible for these disasters. The media closely followed their day to day activities, mceting the 
public's demand for information and answers. Public interest fostered an environment whcrc accident investigations 
were conducted openly, thoroughly and with a keen sense of urgency. 
Numerous books and papers have been written about the dynamics and processes used in these investigatio~is 
and the dcliberations leading to the development of specific recommendations. It is not the intent of this paper to 
repeat those events. Rather. the focus of this paper will be to briefly describe the ibllowing three topics: first, to 
describe how NASA labored to find a process to respond to high-visibility accidents in the post-Challenger era; 
second. to outline the process NASA used to track a id  dacument implementation of the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board reco~nn~endations; and finally, to describe how NASA Headquarters managers used the lessons 
of Challenger and Columhiu to become an organization intent on maintaining a heightened awareness of every 
aspect of today's complex and inherently risky Space Shuttle and ISS niission activities. 
Section 11 provides an overview of the NASA Headquarters mishap response process, and describes how it 
evolved fioin the beginning of the Space Shuttle program based on the Chullengrr accident. Section I11 identifies 
key Icssons learned while implementing the contingency response process fbllowing the C(>Iu,nbiu accident. And 
lastly, Section IV describes the Headquarters Space Operations Center (SOC) and its role in providing situational 
awareness to support senior nianagemcnt bcfore, during. and after a mishap. 
This paper only addresses the NASA mishap response and contingency declaration process as it relates to space 
operations missions under the purview of the NASA Spacc Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD), specifically 
the SSP, the ISS Progran (ISSP). and the Launch Services Progrdin (unmanncd launches with NASA payloads). 
The paper does not address contingency plans and processes that inay exist for other NASA space prograins. 
11. Headquarters 8'Iishap Response Process 
The NASA Headquarters Spacc Shuttle Headquarters Ofiice has been the long-standing responsible office for 
maintaining a contingency response plan or Contingency Action Plan (CAP). In the early post-Apollo era, prior to 
I International Space Station Office. Space Operations Mission Dircctorate, 300 E Street SW; mail code: CJOOO 
' Space Shuttle Prograin Office, Spacc Operations Mission Directorate. 300 E Street SW, mail code: CK000. 
I 
American instihitc of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100008497 2019-08-30T08:55:39+00:00Z
the first Space Shuttle flight (STS-I on April 12-14, 198l), the CAP addressed specific roles and responsibilities for 
Headquarters offices and NASA Ficld Centers involved in SSP proccssing and flight activities. Even the early 
CAP's outlined a process for identifying and responding to SSP-related mishaps. The appointment of a Mishap 
Investigation Board was the responsibility of the Associate Administrator for Spacc Transportation Systems 
(ANSTS) in consultation with the Administrator and the KASA Chief Safety Officer's concurrence. The inishap 
boards were supported by a number of working groups, identificd in the CAP, and in general located at the Field 
Centers. The Working Group chairs were appointed at the time of the mishap, fro111 NASA Field Ccnter personnel 
resources. The eleven initial Working Groups included: 
1) Records and Witnesses 
2) Fire, Explosives & Radiological 
3) Launch, Landing & Retrieval Operations 
4) Facilities &Ground Support 
5 )  Flight Vehicle Syste111s & Performance 
6 )  Payloads 
7) Flight Operations &Network 
8) Flight Crew 
9) Procedures Review 
10) Public Affairs 
1 I) Secretariat 
It is interesting to note that in the CAP'S published prior to the first Space Shuttle flight, the CAP's "effectivity" 
was defined to support just the Space Shuttle's Orbital Flight Test Program. ("EFFECTIVITY. This plan is effective 
immediately and will remain in effect through completion of the Orbital Flight Test Prograin.")! The rcference to the 
Orbital Flight Test Program may havc been a rcference to the first four "lcst" flights of the Space Shuttle. after 
which time it was envisioned that the Space Shuttle vehicle would become a fully "operational" system. However, a 
CAP document not only continued well beyond the Space Shuttle's Orbital Flight Test Program, hut kept intact the 
early definitions; the roles and responsibilities, and the use of Working Groups to support mishaps. Only slight 
changes to the Working Group structure, but not their functionality, occurred over the years leading to the 
ChuNenger accident. 
A. How the Process was influenced by the Challenger Accident 
When the ChaNenger accident occuned, NASA convened a Mishap Investigation Board, following the 
guidelincs of thc CAP. When NASA learned that a Presidential Con~mission was being forlncd to investigate the 
accident, NASA opted to put the mishap board's activities on hold until the Presidential Commission was formed. 
When the Presidential Commission, or Rogers Commission, began their investigation, NASA disbanded its Mishap 
Investigation Board. 
Post-ChaNenger, thc process of how XASA responded to mishaps changed. NASA caiiic away from the accident 
with a renewed motivation of not only maintaining an up-to-date CAP but to also be very proactive in its execution. 
The two most i~nportanl changes to thc CAP supporting this philosophical changc were the formation of ( I )  a 
Headquarters Contingexlcy Action Tcam and a (2) Standing Interagency Mishap Investigation Board. 
When the Associate Administrator for Spacc Operations declares a mishap a contingency, the Adn~inistrator can 
authorize the activation of the Headquarters Contingency Action Team (HCAT) to help focus Headquaiters 
capabilities on an accident invcstigation. This ensures that needed personnel and financial resources are quickly and 
emciently applied to the investigation, and the relaying of accident investigation information to XASA's stakc- 
holders is done with a high level of accmacy and consistency. The HCAT membership is pre-identified in the CAP 
as a group ofsenior NASA Headquarters managers and includes, as a minimum': 
1) NASA Administrator 
2) Deputy Administrator 
3) Associate Administrator 
4) Chief of Staff 
5) Associate Deputy Administrator 
6) White House Liaison 
7) Assistant Adininistrator for External Relations 
8) Associate Administrator for Space Operations 
9) Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Operations 
10) Associate Administrator for Institutions and Management 
1 1) Assistant Adininistrator for Infrastructure 
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12) Assistant Administrator for Security & Program Protection 
13) Chief Engineer 
14) Chicf Safety &Mission Assurance 
15) Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs 
16) Assistant Administrator for Legislative & Intergovernmental Affairs 
17) General Counsel 
18) Chief Iiealth and Medical Officer 
19) Johnson Space Center Technical Authority 
The goal was to quickly determine if the mishap was a contingency and if so, to assembly the HCAT and brief 
them on the available mishap details. This first briefing was referred to as the Mishap Response Teleconference, or 
MRT. Follox,ing the MRT, the JICAT wonid work on a forward plan for managing the contingency and prepare the 
first oficial external notifications to NASA's stake-holders, including the public. 
The second major change was the adoption of a Standing Interagency Mishap Investigation Board. The concept 
for a standing board was proposed in the early 1990s. The idea was "bottom's up" proposed by the two NASA 
Headquaiters staff members responsible for niaintaining the "Agencji Contingenc," Aclion Plan (CAP) f i i r  S{>ace 
Oprration.s"'. The concept was based on lessons learned from the Challenger accident investigation. After a 
thorough internal review, the concept was presented to the White House and approved in late Spring of 1995. The 
Board was to be comprised of the individuals filling the following federal government positions: 
1)  U S .  Navy Commander, Naval Safety Center 
2) U.S. Air Force Commander, Air Force Flight Test Center 
3) U.S. Air Force Commander, Air Force Safety Center (Air Force Chicf of Safety) 
4) Departtilent of Transportation, National Expert on Aviation Human Factors 
5) Federal Aviation Administration, Director of Accident Investigation 
6) U.S. Air Force Commander, 14th Air Force 
7) NASA Field Center Director (not mission related to thc accident) 
Once activated, it was envisioned that the Board would be supported by a NASA Task Foxe. Task Force 
members would be recommended to the Board Chair by thc Associate Adrninistrator for Space Operations, the 
NASA Chief Safety Officer, and the NASA Chief Engineer. The number and skills of the individuals providing 
dedicated support as a Task Force member would ultimately be determined by the mishap scenario and sire of the 
Board with Staff. 
The June 1995 letter to the initial interagency inembers filling the above positiolis asked for their suppoit and 
explained the rationale and their duties as follows: 
"NASA believes that planning for a pre-established accident Lnvcsligation Board %,ill ailow an investigation of an 
incident involving serious injury. loss of life, or significant public interest to begin within 72 houri or the mishap. It 
would also eliminate pciceplion issues that accompany a pizrely intern& KASA investigation. This plan has been 
approved by thc Executive Ofiice ol'the ~residcnt."' 
The Board would use NASA's established support structure of working groups, facilities, and procedures, 
specified in the contingency action pians, ta conduct the investigation, All elements of NASA would respond 
directly to this Board, providing records, data. and any other administrative or technical support as required by the 
Board. 
The responses to NASA's request for a Standing Interagency Mishap Invcstigation Board were unanimoilsly 
ones of endorsement of NASA's initiative to establish such a Board and full support for sewing on a Board if the 
need should ever arise. 
B. Today's Contingency Action Plan 
Today's CAP, the Agency Contingency Action Planjhr Space Operations, is virlually unchanged from the CAP 
in place prior to the Colirmhia accident. The key ciements of the CAP are the scope and definition of a Space 
Operations mishap, the definition of mishap types and the Headquarters roles and rcspo~isibiiities for mishap 
management. 
I. ScopmandD?firiition ? f a  ,Wi.sha$ 
The SOMD CAP covers all Space Operations (SO) programs: the SSP, the ISSP, and the Launch Services 
Program (LSP) (nnmanncd launches with NASA payloads). Tlie definition of a "Space Operations mishap" has 
become all encompassing: 
An SO mishap is defincd hcrc as any mishap. mission failure. or high visibility close call that causcs or may cause a 
major impact to space operations or prevcnts accomplishment of a primvw missioir objective involving SOMD- 
controlled pcrsonnei. hdrd~vare, support equipment. or facilities or any pasonnci, hardivarc. sottivarc. equipment, or 
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facilities that have been integraled with SOMU-controlled flight rclated systems. An SO mishap can involvc any SOMD 
space operations or development program. including suspected mishap situations at contractor facilities andlor 
government facilities operatcd under contra&." 
2. Mishap Tpe.v4 
Mishaps are classified by Type (A, B, C; D. or Close Call), with a Type A mishap being the most severe. The 
deiinitions have remained unchanged for many years. Periodically there have been hints that the safety community 
would like to increase the dollar amounts associated with each Mishap Type in order to maintain a system of 
multiple categories. Due more to inflation than mishap severity, the trend has been for an increase in Type A 
mishaps. Listed below is a simplified version of the current mishap definitions: 
1) m: Total direct cost of mission failure and property damage is S1,000.000 or morc and injuries or 
illness result in fatalities or pemlanent total disabilities. 
2) M: Total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of at least $250,000 hut less than 
$1,000,000 and injuries or illness result in permanent partial disabilities. 
3) m: Total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of at lcast $25,000 hut less than $250,000 
and nonfatal injuries or illness resulting in lost workdays. 
4) m: Total direct cost of mission failure and property danlage of at lcast Sl.OOO hut less than $25,000 
and any recordable injury or illness. 
5) Close Call: An event in which there is no damage or damage less than Sl000 and no injuries or minor 
injuries only, hut which possesses a potential to cause a mishap. 
3. Roles and~es~onsihi l i t ie .~~ 
Each Headquarters organization plays a unique role in supporting a mishap investigation. While each 
organization has its assigncd responsibilities, it should come as no surprise that the synergy of working as a team is 
the most effective response for a major mishap. The organizations and their responsibilities are summarized below: 
1) The Administrator can activate the HCAT to oversee an accident investigation, and may appoint a Senior 
Agency Official - Washington (SAO-W) to be a liaison with the Administration. 
2) The Suace Ouerations Mission Directorate makes the decision to identify a mishap as a contingency, 
provides initial information to the HCAT members, and recommends Board selection. 
3) The Office of Public Affairs manages and coordinates news inquiries. 
4) Safetv and Mission Assurance provides advice to ihc Administrator and approval and concurrence as the 
Board is formed. 
5) External Relations assists with ISS Partner notifications and reviews of international agreements. 
6) The Office of Le~is-and Interrovernmental Affairs assists with notifications to members of Congress 
and the Administration. 
7 )  The Office of Institutions & Manaeement assists with payments for supplies, services and travel. 
8) Field Center Directors at Kennedy Suace Center, Marshall S ~ a c c  Flight Center. Stennis Snace Center, and 
Johnso-rovide mishap information & implement contingency decisions. 
9) SOMD Program Managers take appropriate actions to minimize losses, and preserve evidence, should a 
mishap occur. 
10) The Health and Medical Officer provides medical suppori to all aspects of the contingency. 
l I) NASA Contractors arc required to report mishaps and participate in investigations. 
The KASA Field Centers and Programs also have their own mishap response plans that define their mishap and 
contingency procedures In a summary fashion; the relationship between Headquarters and Center responsibilities is 
shown in Fig. I .  Throughout the various CAP revisions, the role of the Field Centers has remained one of procedures 
development to ensure timely mishap notification, investigation technical support, and recordkecping. When a 
mishap occurs, the responsible Center will he involved with impounding data and thc formation of technical 
Working Groups for mishap investigation support. Headquarters is responsible for defining policies, roles and 
responsibilities, and reporting requirementsiprocedt~res. Headquarters also works with the Centers to conduct 
periodic CAP program simulations for management training. The focus of these simulations is to address 
management's response to a mishap, management decisions that needed to be made as a result of the mishap. the 
role of other governinent agencies in supporting the mishap, and external notifications. 
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4. ,%fi.slisl?ap Response Tirneline 
When a mishap xcurs,  the CAP clearly specifies a 
timeline for activities and decisions leading to the 
selection of a Mishap li~vestigation Board (ME). The 
organization involved is required to report the mishap to 
the Associate Adaninistiator for Space Opcrations within 
60 minutes of occurrence, (To facilitate this notification 
the CAP has a "Sensitive hut Unclassified section, with 
restricted distribution, that contains telephone numbers 
for top Goveminent officials, International Partners, and 
NASA senior management.) From the initial notification 
to the selection of an MIR is no greater than a 48 hour 
process. All the key decisions are made within that time 
period: classifying the mishap as a contingency; 
activating the HCAT and the standing Interagency 
Investigation Board; conducting the Mishap Response 
~eleconference for the H C A T - ~ ~ ~  prepark& the first 
official external mishap notifications. A timeline of these 
activities appears in Fig. 2 
Figure 1. Functional Responsibilities 
or ProgrrmSbnagcr 
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Figure 2. NASA Mishap Activation and Response Timeline 
I l l .  Lessons Learned from the Columbia Accident 
4. NASA's CAP and the Experience of the Coluntbiu Accident - Policy meets Reality 
On February I ,  2003, the Space Shuttle Colunzhiu was beginning its reentry for a planned landing at the 
Kennedy Space Center's Shuttle Landing Facility at approximately 9:16 AM EST. The dcorhit hum maneuver 
began at approximately 8:15 AM and was exccutcd nominally. In the Johnson Space Center's Mission Control 
Center (MCC), the reentry appeared nominal until 8:54 AM when 4 hydraulic sensors in the left wing indicated "off- 
scale low." This indication meant that the sensors had failed. At 8:59 AM, the pressure readings on both left main 
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landing gear tires were lost. Seconds later, the MCC lost communications with Columhia and shortly aRer that 
ground observers made video recordings showing that the Columbia was breaking up on its entry track over Texas.' 
At NASA Headquarters. the capability to monitor mission activity was limited to local TV news and a handful of 
mission audio loops. A single employee was monitoring Columhia's reentry that Saturday morning from a small 
Headquarters conference room. The Associate Administrator for Space Operations, the NASA Chief Safety Officer, 
and the NASA Administrator were among the first called, shortly after 9:00 AM, when the media began showing 
video of the Columbia reentry. The decisions to declare a contingency and stand up the HCAT were made 
immediately. 
By 11 :00 AM. the HCAT was in place, supported by many other Headquarters employees who came in to help 
in whatever way they could. The Administrator made a decision to activate the Standing interagency Mishap 
Investigation Board. The Administrator and Associate Administrator for Spacc Operations called the Interagency 
BoardMembers and established a teleconference meeting time of 1:00 PM EST. 
By 2 0 0  PM EST, NASA had established the Standing Interagency Mishap Investigation Board_ later called the 
Columhia Accident Investigation Board or CAIB. Following a review of Board member responsibilities, a Mishap 
Response Teleconference was held to brief the HCAT and lnteragency Board on the details of the mishap. Early the 
next day, the Administrator asked Admiral Harold W. Gehman. Jr. W.S. Navy, Retired) to be the Board Chairman. 
The investigation had begun. The CAIB added 5 additional Board members and enlisted a large staff of advisors, 
technical experts and support staff to manage the data review, the testing associated with finding the primary cause 
of the accident, and the writing of the Final Report. 
Headquarters stood up a 2417 Return to Flight (RTF) Action Center until the CAIB released its final report in 
August 2003: The task of the Action Center was to maintain awareness of every aspect of the investigation, to 
organize the efforts of the HCAT, and to ensure the technical accuracy of every press release. To ensure consistency 
and accuracy, the Headquarters Public Affairs Office issued all NASA press releases related to the Columbia 
accident. 
As the CAIB was rciessing its reconunendations, NASA formed an independent RTF Task Group to monitor 
implementation of each CAlB recommendation. Headquarters not only implemented the CAIB recommendations, 
but also provided the public with a regularly updated account of how the implementation and return to flight were 
proceeding. The document used for this purpose was the "NASA Imple~~%enfufio~? I'lanfor Space Shuffle Return to 
Flight and ~e~or id ' . "  This document snnrmarized NASA's implementation of the CAIB recommendations as well as 
additional, intemally-generated activities designed to ensure a safe return to flight. It was published and roiitinely 
B. Lessons Learned 
I. The CAP Process Work.s 
When the Columbia accident occurred, was NASA better prepared to handle a major accident than it had been 
prior to Challenger? To a very great extent, it was. The CAP played out exactly as written. All CAP requirements 
were followed and resulted in meeting the CAP'S goal-oriented timeline (Fig. 2). The verbal and written 
establishnlent of an MIB - the Standing Interagency Mishap Investigation Board, was accomplished in less than a 
day. From a procedural standpoint it could not have happened any more efficiently. 
HCAT management of the accident from February I ,  2003. through the delivery of the CATB report, met all 
expectations. The HCAT stayed engaged in the details of the accident investigation and respondcd promptly to 
requests for resources to keep the investigation moving. 
The Colun~biiz accident scenario was different than anything imagined in prior mishap simulations. Prior to 
Columhia, mishap simulations were predominately launch relatcd and assumed a relatively small debris field. For 
Columbia, the debris field extended from sparsely populated areas southeast of Dallas, Texas, to western Louisiana. 
With the help of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), and the U.S. Forest Service, a walk-down was organized to search for Orbiter debris (Fig. 3). Eventually, the 
walk-down included I69 Tcxas counties and 52 pdrishcs in Louisiana. The search area amounted to 620,999 acres. 
Included in this area was the 14.48 square mile Toledo Bend Resen~oir. 
The CAP worked well in getting the mishap investigation started. Once implenlented, process changes were 
made to accommodate the unique circumstances of the Columbia accident. Following Colurrihia it was thought best 
to leave any further CAP modifications to be addressed as a function of thc inishap details. However, the one strong 
message from Columbia remained the need for constant vigilance. 
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2. The Need f i ~ r  Situationui 
Awarme.~s 
Certainly the CAP played a 
critical role in the proactive response 
to the Columhia mishap. The 
significant lesson learned from 
Columhia was the realization that for 
all future missions, starting with the 
first post-Columhia RTF mission 
(STS-I14 in July 2005) KASA 
Headquarters managers u~ould need 
to discipline themsclvcs to 
maintaining a close situational 
awareness for all mission events. 
Maintaining situational awareness 
would keep the entire team aware of 
problems as they and Figure 3. U.S. Forest Service Employees Search for Orbiter Debris 
perhaps give time to work problems 
before they developed into mishaps. 
To facilitate situational awareness at Headquarters, KASA created the SOC. From an operational standpoint, 
Headquarters was transitioning from a strategic oversight role to an operational tactical role. The capabilities and 
operation of the SOC are discussed in derail in Section 1V of this paper. 
3. Independence ofthe Standing Inre~agencj' Miyhi~p investigation Board 
Another lesson had to do with the perceived independence of the Standing Interagency Mishap Investigation 
Board. During and post-Columbia, therc were debates about whether or not the CAIB was a truly "independent" 
hoard. At issue early on was the use of NASA's Chief of Safety and the KASA Chief Enginccr as an Ex-Officio 
Board member and Executive Secretaty, respectively. The intent of the CAP in assigning these roles was to assist 
the Board meinbcrs with using NASA proccdures to conduct the investigation. Shortly after the CAIB convened, the 
Chief of Safety removed himself as an Ex-Officio Board member due to a perceived conflict of interest. Later, the 
Board was allowed to develop and use its own investigation process to further help alleviate concern that the Board 
was not independent. The CAIB continued to follow the CAP process that showed it would report to the NASA 
Administrator. The CAP system of Support Staff (referred to as a Task Group in the CAP) and Advisors to the 
CAIB uras used with minor modifications. 
The Interagency Board organizational structure outlined in the CAP is shown in Fig. 4. 
-w.i;s-mi-C9 .................. NASA !nde;;ende:it / 
Re,,ic>~ Board 
2 M-- bee- 
Figure 4. Standing Interagency Mishap hestigation Board and NASA Organizational Relationships 
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Although most believed that the Board did a very good job of maintaining its independence, some still doubted 
that it could be independent given its reporting responsibility to the NASA Administrator and the large number of 
NASA staff that supported the Board's investigation. To "correct" this perceived flaw. a new requirement was 
placed in Public Law 109-155. the NASA Authorization Act of 2005~. Title VIII, Subtitle B of this Law established 
a requirement for a Presidential Commission, called the "Human Space Flight Independent Investigation 
Commission", to be formed ifSASA has a high-visibility mishap involving loss of crew or vehicle. 
The operating guidelines for the Commission would be as follows: The Commission will be established within 7 
days of a mishap that results in loss of a Space Shuttle, the ISS or its operational viability, any olhcr government- 
owned U.S. space vehicle carrying humans, or a crew member or passenger of any space vehicle described above. It 
will investigate and determine cause; identifji all contributing factors; make recommendations; and prepare a report 
to Congress, the President, and the public (including minority opinions and interim reports as necessary). It has the 
power to hold hearings and subpoena evidence, enter into contracts, and obtain assistance from other Federal 
Agencies as necessary. NASA employees are not allowed to serve on the Commission, except that the NASA 
Engineering and Safety Center will provide data and technical ruppott as requested by the Commission. 
At the time of a mishap, NASA senior management would decide whether or not NASA should conduct its own 
investigation, as outlined in the CAP, in parallel with the Commission investigation. 
IV. T h e  N A S A  Headquarters Space Operations Center (SOC) 
The NASA Headquarters SOMD has established the SOC as a focal point to support senior management before, 
during, and after a contingency involving SOMD missions. The SOC facility, as shown in Fig. 5.  is located on the 
7Ih floor of the NASA Headquarters building in Washington, DC. The SOC, which was created after the Columbia 
accident, has supported all Space Shuttle missions since Return to Flight in 2005, as well as ongoing operations of 
the ISS. This section describes the capabilities of the SOC and its role in providing situational awareness for a 
spaceflight contingency response. 
Figure 5.  The NASA Headquarters Space Operations Center 
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Table I.  Summary of SOC capabilities 
Controlled access facility wlmotion detectors 
Dedicated room operator 
Mission voice loops (Shuttle and ISS) via NASA 
standard voice keysets 
HD video and audio conferencing systems 
5 UD room video cameras 
Five 65" HD plasma televisions 
Can display up to 19 separate video displays 
sin~ultaneously 
Cable, Direct TV, HDTV, and direct feed C-Band 
mission TV capable 
HD video recordingipiayhack capahilities 
Two HD projectors and fixed HD screens 
4 camera views of realtime ISS video downlink 
Laptops and access-controlled data server 
Dedicated SOC email account 
25 1GB VOIP telephones (international capable) 
50 table-top interfaces to local area networks 
14 location time zone clocks 
Mission Elapsed Time (from NASA tracking 
stations) & Mission Event clocks 
Individually controlled room speakers 
Touch screen room controllers 
External touch screens with mission and meeting 
information 
Access to key mission systems (e.g., SSP 
subsystem engineering data, Mission Control 
Centcr internet-based audio and information 
systems) 
In-room printer, fax machines, and docninent 
scanners 
Independent heatinglAC controls 
UPS backup power 
A. SOC Capabilities 
The SOC provides a secure environment for 
receiving and displaying sufficiently detailed mission 
data to enable Headquarters staff to monitor and 
assess mission operations in real-time. SOC resources 
are used to provide senior Agency management with 
reliable and timely status and assessments of Space 
Shuttle and ISS mission operations. Capabilities 
needed to nerform these functions include realtime 
access to mission video, data, and voice loops; video 
and voice conferencing capabilities; robust 
multimedia display capabilities; dedicated laptops and 
printers; secure data storage; telephones and network 
drops: and multiple missionjtime zone clocks to 
support the international launch and mission 
operations that are monitored from the SOC. Because 
the SOC is used strictly for mission monitoring and 
has no actual command and control functions, there is 
no conunanding capability. A summary of SOC 
capabilities is shown in Table 1 
The SOC was designed to function as both a full 
featured conference room and a mission support 
facility. This enables Headquarters personnel to 
participate in routine mission meetings, such as the 
daily SSP and ISS Mission Management Team 
(MMT) meetings, where key mission decisions are 
madc, while simultaneously monitoring mission 
onerations. (The SOC can and has been used to allow 
NASA senior managers video and telephone access to 
crcws on orbit.) 
In the case of a declared spaceflight contingency, 
the SOC provides a secure location for senior 
managers to convene for mishap response meetings 
and to collecWdisseminate information. 
Two additional nearby conference rooms with 
limited SOC capahilities are also available as 
overflow or backup facilities when needed. 
B. Role of the SOC in Providing Routine Situational Awareness 
As was discussed in Section I11 of this paper. one of the key lessons learned from the Colunlhia accident was the 
need to increase the levcl of situational awareness prior to and during a mishap to enable a more effective and timely 
response. Since Columbia, the SOMD has enhanced its monitoring of critical human spaceflight events, using the 
SOC capabilities described above, in order to provide senior managers with routine mission status reports and 
contingency alerts. The SOC staff, comprised of senior SOMD personnel supporting the SSP and ISSP, performs 
these monitoringlreporting functions and provides the linkage between flight management teams and Headquarters 
senior management. The SOC staff distills pertinent technical information from a variety of detailed mission data 
sources (e.g., mission video, voice loops, information systems, meetings) and summarizes key points at a level 
appropriate to recipients of thc SOC status mports. 
Who is the audience for the SOC reports? In general. the audience is senior Agency leadership, other U.S. 
federal agencies, and NASA Hcadqua~terslCenter personnel who need to be informed of or involved in a Space 
Shuttle or ISS contingency response. .4s defined in Section I1 of this paper, this includes the HCAT, XASA 
Headquarters and Center senior management, mishap investigation board members, 1SS and SSP managers, key 
personnel in the U.S. Govcmrnent executive branch, and Headquarters personnel representing functional areas such 
as safety and mission assurance, engineering, public affairs, external relations, general counsel. institutional 
management, and legislative affairs, that would support the mishap response. 
9 
American Institute of Aeronautics and ~Xstronautics 
I. Moniroring of1SS Operations 
The SOC is not staffed on a continual basis, even though the ISS Program has ongoing crewed operations 2417, 
SOC monitoring and reporting of ISS operations is reserved for certain critical mission activities, which are 
considered to be either inherently more risky or of rnuch greater interest than routine daily operations. Events that 
are monitored include all spacewalks (also known as Extravehicular Activity (EVA)), arrivals1departures of visiting 
vehicles to the ISS, launchesllandings of ISS crewmembers aboard Russian Soyuz spacecraft, and relocations of a 
Soyuz spacecraft at the ISS. ISS international partner vehicles that have visited the ISS include thc Russian crewed 
Soyuz, and uncrewed Russian Progress, European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and Japanese H-Il Transfer 
Vehicle (HTV) vehicles. Commercial cargo vehicles are expected to arrive in the next few years, follo\ved by future 
crewed exploration vehicles. All of these events are monitored; other evcnts may bc monitored on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Event status reports are typically just brief text inessages describing progress or completion of a mission event, 
sent via e-mail to a pre-defined distribution list. Here is an exainplc of a message used for the arrival of a visiting 
vehicle, in this case the Japanese HTV: 
I I . ! , . . :  I !  I ! ! !  . I ! . \ - 1  . 1, ~:b:~l.,.: ,.,r ..,1,,.,r. .%,.~! 1.:r,:,,,; ',!,:, It,,. ,,,:I, ,#.#!, ,I,;: !,. 
!.I.u ;b! $::~:!!,h:, I 1. PI: 11: \ .: % C,\I . :!\ ~p.!.~:.l .I -,.I,.\ 11 I' .+, !:,I>,,II.,!.~~ ,#I!\ . r ,.> .%rr.x \: ..I :I:: IS\ 
The vehicle is currently at a hold point 30 melcrsfiom the ISS and is schcdulcd to arrive at ihc capture point (8.9 m from 
ISS) at approximately 3:30 prn EDT. ISS Flight Engineers Nicoic Stolt and Frank DeWinne wiil use the station robotic 
arm lo capture HW-I and bcrth it to the Node 2 nadir port. Capture is scheduled for approximately 330 pm EDT. Thc 
Spacc Operations Center (SOC) is slaffcd and will monitor this event. 
Here is an example of a typical status message marking the start of an ISS EVA: 
ISS Commander Gcnnady Padalka and Flight Engineer Mike Barrall haw begun tonight's spacewalk, x,ith hatch opening 
at 2:55 AM EDT. The EVA is scheduled lo last less than I hour. Tonioht's "internal" EVA will take place within the 
depressurized transfcr compartment betx,een the Service Module and the Functional Cargo Block (FGB) module. The 
crew will relocate a docking cone to the zenith docking asscmbiy where the Mini-Research Module 2 (MRM?) will be 
docked in November. The MRM2 will provide an additional docking port for Russian vehicles. 
2. Monitoring uJSpace Shuttie opera fir in.^ 
Monitoring and reporting for Space Shuttle missions is more extensive than for standalone ISS events. In 
addition to realtime status reports for critical events, there are SOC Daily Reports (described below) that can bc used 
for more detailed discussion of mission issues. 
The SOC is staffed from several days before a Shu~ttle launch until after landing. SOC reporting hcgins with the 
results of the Launch minus 2 Day (L-2) and L-1 Mission Management Team (MMT) meetings, so that senior 
managers are aware of any issues that are being worked prior to launch. The SOC team also monitors the pre-launch 
sequence, beginning with tanking, and provides periodic stanis messages tracking the progress of the Launch 
coumtdom, including updates to thc launch weather forecast. 
For each on-orbit flight day between launch and landing, the SOC team monitors mission operations and key 
mission meetings. A SOC Daily Report is produced which surnmanzes the day's major accomplishments, status of 
Shuttle and ISS systems, significant issues that may impact the mission, key decisions that have been made by the 
Shuttle and ISS MMTs, and a sumniary of upcoming events by flight day. The SOC Daily Report includes the 
current assessment of the Shuttle's Thermal Protection System (TPS), as downlinked imagery of the TPS is 
evaluated until the TPS is cleared for landing. An example of the SOC Daily Repon is provided in Fig. 6. 
Space Shuttlc Landing day, like launch day, is monitored very closely with numerous status updates from de- 
orbit prep through "Wheels Stop" at the two CONUS Shuttle landing sites: KSC in Florida or Edwards Air Force 
Rase in California. Besides launch and landing, realtiiule event status inessages are also sent for docking, undocking, 
EVAs, significant robotic operations. and other key events. 
3. .%fission Briefing Packages 
Also. prior to each Space Shuttle flight and Soyuz mission to the ISS; a briefing package is distributed to the 
standard SOC distribution list which describes basic infonrlation about the rrrission and the Headquarters 
contingency action plan. This background information, aioilg with the realtiine unission status updates, helps to 
promote the situational awareness that is necded to effectively respond to a contingency situation. Management 
knows when critical spaceflight events are about to happen, when they are completed, and is infonned of issues as 
they arise, so that if significant problems do occur. they are in a much better position to react. Senior managers and 
others within the NASA Headquarters building also know that they can come to thc SOC to watch a mission event 
firsthand, to get a quick status, or to request additional infonnation about a specific issue. 
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SOC Dai ly Summary for STS-127lISS 2JIA 
Fl ight  Day 03 (July 17, 2009) 
Todav's Hiahliahts Fliaht Dav 03 fFD 03k 
From 12:56!o 1:05 PM EDT. Endeavour successfullv executed an R-Bar Pitch Maneuver. allowina S ~ a c e  
- 
Siai u f l  persorlr.e :o DQU!ugrapn il,e Or3 :er s ue ) Tne,~,, Pcoiect un Sysic,!~ T2S e T"L' p.,o:og.aons 
n I oe donn nned Ig'ana ys s a,,c ine res.. :s of i , T s  1'1s s--ve, (epuned a! an ..pco'l (lq Space Sn,:: e 
Mission Management ~ e a m  eeting. 
Endeavour docked with Station at 1:47 PM EDT and the hatches between the two spacecraft were opened at 
355 PM, 
Later today, the Space Shuttle crew will begin preparations for tomorrow's first of five planned EVAs. 
Shuttle Status 
. All orbiter svstems are Derformina nominallv 
. Debr~s ~na iys is  Team status T& FD 2 R ~ C  inspections were completed yesterday and all imaqew was 
dowv nkea C,.re,li y :tie Lebe 1 ana i s  s . s  como e:e anu :nr rroru aela ed -ele 2 an3 ys s s 
appro* nia:cly 67": cum3e:e k o  ssdes nave see? ce!r:',ed so far 
. Cryo margins (above 16+0+2) are Hydrogen limited: 24 hours of "SSPTS-off' time available; 48 hours of 
'SSPTS-on" time availabie. 
ISS Status 
There are currently no ISS systems that wouid impact docked operations. 
With today's exchange of Soyuz seatliners, Endeavour Mission Specialist Tim Kopra and Space Station Flight 
Engineer Koichi Wakata swap crew affiliations. Wakata has spent 124 days in space, 122 days as a space 
station Expedition crew member. 
Mission Timeiine Look-Ahead (All times are Eastern Davliqht Time): 
July 18 (FD 04) EVA # I  (JEF lns!allation. UCCASSIPAS deploys, CETA cart mods) 
Shuttie crew wake up (7:03 AM) 
EVA # I  Egress (12:03 PM) 
JEF UnberthiHandoff (1:43 PM) 
. JEF Install (538 PM) 
EVA # I  ingress (6:23 PM) 
. Shuttle crew sleep (22:33 PM) 
Meetings: international Space Station MMT at 9:00 AM: Space Shuttie MMT at 2:00 PM 
July 19 (FD 05) Focused Inspection (If Required), ICC-VLD Unberth 
Juiy 20 (FD 06) ICC-VLD install: EVA #2 (Spares Transfer to ESP-3, JEF forward VE install) 
Juiy 21 (FD 07) JLE Installation 8 Activation, %day off, ICC-VLD Translate to Worksite 8 
July 22 (FD 08) EVA #3 (JAXA Payload Prep. P6 Battery R&R (4)) 
Juiy 23 (FD 09) JAXA Payload Transfers from JLE to JEF 
July 24 (FD 10) EVA#4 (P6 Battery R&R (2). JAXA aft VE install), ICC-VLD Return to PCB 
July 25 (FD 11) Crew Off Duty Day 
July 26 (FD 12) JLE Transfer to Payioad Bay 
July 27 (FD 13) EVA #5 (SPDM MLI, 21 Patch Panel, PAS Deploys, WETA install) 
Julv 28 (FD 141 Hatch Close. Undock. Flvaround 
JUI; 29 (FD 15j Late lnspectlon 
Julv 30 (FD 16) FCS Checkout. RCS Hot Flre. DRAGONSAT and ANDE-2 Deolovs 
, , 
duly 31 (FD 17j Nominal KSC Landing (at approximately 10:45 AM EDT) 
NASA Headquarters 
Space Operations Center (SOC), 7D61 
Figure 6. Sample SOC Daily Report f rom mission STS-127 1 ISS - 2JiA 
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C. Rote of the SOC During and After a Mishap 
In the event of a mishap affecting the Space Shuttle or ISS, those on duty in the SOC at the time of the mishap 
will assist as needed in initiating the appropriate response per the process defined in Section I1 of this paper. This 
may include notifying management, the HCAT, and others of the mishap. After a contingency is formally declared, 
the SOC facility will transition to the HCAT which will use it as the HCAT Action Center, as was done after the 
Columbia accident. As was noted earlier, the SOC provides a secure environment with videoconferencing 
capabilities that can be used for mishap response meetings and data collection. 
In case of a mishap involving an ISS visiting vehicle (e.g., Progress. S o p z ,  ATV, HTV), the vehicle owner 
(e.g., space agency of Russia, Europe, or Japan; commcrcial launch vehicle provider) is responsible for the mishap 
response and mishap investigation related to the vehicle. However, if the ISS or the ISS crew is impacted by the 
mishap, then the NASA SOMD contingency action plan may also be invoked. 
V. Conclusions 
Historically, NASA's SOMD CAP has provided the Agency with the policy, roles and responsibilities, and 
procedures documentation to effectively respond to mishaps. Lessons learned from the Challenger accident left 
NASA better prepared to handle a high visibility mishap and implement the CAP for the Col~rmhia accident. The 
Agency response to the Coirrrnhia accident demonstrated the flexibility of the CAP and yielded new lessons for 
responding to future mishaps. This could lead one to believe that nothing is left to do to prepare for another possible 
mishap. The reality may be that there is nothing M h e r  fiom the truth. 
As NASA continues to operate in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and begins planning to move human exploration 
beyond LEO, the complexity of handling a mishap will no doubt significantly increase. A lack of recoverable 
hardware and delaying the start of a mishap investigation pending safe return of crew have the potential to 
complicate the determination of cause and sound implementing solutions. Also, NASA's increasing reliance on 
International Partners and curnmercial providers for crew and cargo transportation to the ISS could further 
complicate a mishap response because of the additional players involved in the process. Depending on the nature of 
the mishap and the vehicle(s) involved, there is a potential for multiple investigation boards to be operating 
simultaneously. 
Finally, situational awareness of mission events, before, during, and after a mishap, is critical. Along with 
effective contingency planning. tools that assist decision makers in maintaining situational awareness are the best 
means to prepare for, and possibly even prevent, future mishaps, The NASA Headquarters Space Operations Center 
is one such tool. 
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